Cornell Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 4 April 1974

Article 10

Swords and Scales the Development of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice
Frederick Bernays Wiener

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Frederick Bernays Wiener, Swords and Scales the Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice , 59 Cornell L. Rev. 748 (1974)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol59/iss4/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

BOOK REVIEW
Swords and Scales. The Development of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR. Port Washington,
N.Y. and London: Kennikat Press. 1973. Pp. x, 250. $12.50.
Two hundred and eighty-five years ago, the English Parliament of the Glorious Revolution, declaring that "it being requisite
for.

..

an exact Discipline to be observed ... that Soldiers ... be

brought to a more exemplary and speedy Punishment than the
usual forms of Law will allow," enacted the first Mutiny Act.' One
hundred and ninety-seven years ago, the Continental Congress
framed the Articles of Confederation and ratified a power it had
already twice exerted: "To make rules for the government and
regulation of the said land and naval forces. '2 Ten years later the
Constitutional Convention conferred the same power in the same
words on the new Congress; 3 and when the Bill of Rights was
adopted, the fifth amendment expressly exempted the active duty
forces from any requirement of indictment by grand jury.4
The men who effected the Glorious Revolution in Britain, like
the men who waged 'the long and arduous war for American
independence, were not theoretical doctrinaires. They recognized,
indeed they took for granted, the truism that whereas the object of
a criminal code for a civilian community is to enable people to live
together in peace and security, the object of a criminal code for the
armed forces is to send men obediently to their death in conflict
with the public foe.
As long as armies were small and essentially professional, the
sharp contrast between the civil and military communities 5 was
primarily of academic interest. But when, as in the later American
1I W. & M. c. 5 (1689).
2 Art. 9 of the Articles of Confederation, submitted to the States on Nov. 15, 1777 (9 J.
CONT. CONG. 919). The Articles of War earlier adopted by the Continental Congress were
those of June 30, 1775 (2id. 111), which were soon superseded by those of Sept. 20, 1776 (5
id. 788).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 14.
4 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; . . .
5 See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("The military constitutes a,
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian"). See also
Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338, 357 (1946) (reference to "vast gulf between civil and
military jurisdiction").
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wars, it became imperative to raise massive forces by compulsion,
the impact of a sterner military code on the countless citizens
suddenly subject to its provisions had grave potential for war-time
difficulties and for post-war and anti-military reaction.
Trouble was averted for the United States Army in the Civil
War and for the United States Navy in both World Wars because
service in those forces did not involve scicial inversion. Civil War
volunteers could be tried only by courts-martial composed of
volunteer officers, normally drawn from the same community as
the culprit,' while the Navy in both World Wars commissioned its
nonregular officers on the basis of educational qualifications, from
those who had the ability or (more generally) the means to acquire
a college degree. But the mass armies of both World Wars were
officered by those selected by competition, through the rigorous
proving ground of the Officer Candidate School. In consequence,
as in Barrie's Admirable Crichton, the butler frequently wound up as
the commander, and the resultant social inversion created much
unhappiness, sentiment that was translated into thorough revisions
of the military code. World War I was followed by the 1920
amendment to the Articles of War, 7 World War II by further
amendments in the Elston Act 8 and, a little later, by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. 9
Dr. Generous starts his study of the development of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice with a discussion of some of the
difficulties that surfaced when the 1916 Articles of War, which had
deliberately rejected the Civil War safety-valve just mentioned,"'
was applied to an army four million strong led by a hurriedly
trained officer corps, of whom probably less than ten percent had
had any prior military experience. After dealing rather sketchily
6 By Article of War 97 of 1806 (carried into R.S. § 1342 as Article of War 77), regular
officers were "not ... competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of
other forces." See W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 92-93 (2d ed. 1896). The
same provision governed during the Spanish-American War. See United States v. Brown,
206 U.S. 240 (1907); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 787,
8 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, tit. II, 62 Stat. 604, 627.
9 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (now 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970)).
10The 1908 amendments to the Dick Act provided that courts-martial for the trial of
militia while in federal service required only a majority militia membership. Act of May 27,
1908, ch. 204, § 6, 35 Stat. 399, 401. The short-lived and soon forgotten Volunteer Act of
1914 abolished all distinctions between officers of the several components in respect of, inter
alia, service on courts-martial. Act of April 25, 1914, ch. 71, § 4, 38 Stat. 347, 347-48. And
Article of War 4 of the 1916 Articles (Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 650)
made all officers in the military service of the United States competent to serve on all
courts-martial. This has been the law ever since. See 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
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with World War II, the author covers the passage of the Elston
Act, the genesis and ultimate adoption of the Uniform Code, the
framing of the 1951 "Manual for Courts-Martial," and the selection
of the initial members of the Court of Military Appeals. Then
follow chapters -analyzing that tribunal's decisions, the deflections
in doctrine that accompanied personnel changes, service reactions
to the court's rulings, the problem of administrative discharges,
and further legislation through the Military Justice Act of 1968."
Much of the material used is still in manuscript form, many
letters were obtained from participants in the matters discussed,
and over twenty personal interviews are listed. The author is not
without insight, as opening and closing passages in his book make
clear:
All too many observers have seen the struggle as one which
pitted enlightened civilian reformers, bent on bringing the blessings of civilian judicial practices to the military, against archreactionaries in the service, fabricated from the Prussian mold
and determined
to preserve the autocratic power of com12
manders.

. . . The history related in these pages suggests that the
Uniform Code had been a failure in a number of important ways.... Within the services, the code has created large

legal bureaucracies, connected to the defense effort only tangentially.' 3
Unfortunately, Dr. Generous does not comment on the letdown in discipline that paralleled the "criminal law revolution"
loosed on the country by the Supreme Court of the 1960's. There
is no mention of the many, many "fragging" incidents in Viet Nam,
nor of the lax discipline that has almost destroyed the combat
14
effectiveness of our forces in Europe today.
Moreover, the book suffers from a built-in schizophrenia. On
one hand, the author recognizes the factors just quoted from his
book; on the other, he marches in warm sympathy with "the bar
association reformers," primarily a group of articulate New York
doctrinaires who, while acquiescing in the power of a field commander to order an invasion such as the cross-Channel attack on
Normandy in 1944, with its inevitable concomitant of a myriad of
inescapable casualties, are nevertheless unwilling to trust that same
11Act

of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335.
P. 3.
13 P. 205.
14 Moskos, Coping in Europe, 23 ARMY 12 (No. 11, Nov. 1973).
12
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individual with the appointment of a court-martial
to try any
15
officer or soldier for any military offense.
Similarly, while denigrating the pages of Colonel William
Winthrop's classic and still authoritative treatise as "militaristic," 16
Generous fails to realize that in many significant respects the
gallant and learned colonel was actually expressing the views of the
Founders. It was Winthrop's opinion that the assistance of counsel
at military law was a privilege rather than a right,' 7 a pronouncement guaranteed to raise the hackles, not to say the blood pressures, of both absolutist libertarians as well as post-prandial bar
association pontificators of almost any epoch. But on this point,
Winthrop was simply restating the interpretation that President
Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights, placed on the first ten
amendments to the Constitution. Madison, who read court-martial
records carefully, approved the conviction of General William Hull
for surrendering Detroit in 1812, although that aged incompetent
had clearly been denied the kind of assistance of counsel that he
would have received in a civil court.' 8 Further, the principle
fundamental to military law, that an army is "a collection of
armed men, obliged to obey one man,"' 9 is stigmatized by Generous as "the popular conception of a Prussian officer."20
This lack of a consistent outlook, combined with an undue
emphasis on personalities, results in episodic "gee whiz!" treatment
of a long simmering controversy. Consequently, the fifty-year history covered by this book sometimes reads like a TV melodrama,
with the colors of the contestants' hats clearly seen. Most regrettable of all, the author's insufficient background and lack of legal
training have led him into a host of demonstrable mistakes. Here
are a few of the most glaring:
1. Chapter 16, "The Federal Courts and Military Justice," is a
hotchpot of decisions on varied topics, cited interchangeably; suits
for back pay, trials for violations of the laws of war, and cases
delimiting the scope of collateral review of court-martial proceedings are all lumped together under the rubric, "To Intervene or
'5 See Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 260, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 777 (1962).
16 Pp. 7, 72.
17 W. WINTHROP, supra note 6, at 241-43.
Is Wiener, Courts-Martialand the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1,

29-31, 45-46 (1958).
19 This principle was first formulated by General W. T. Sherman in Proceedings of the
United Services Institutionfor 1879. It derives ultimately from a John Locke apothegm (via Dr.
Johnson's dictionary).
20 P. 49.
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Not." The result is so confused as to suggest a discussion of
antibiotics, open-heart surgery, and kidney dialysis by a physician
trained only in the ancients' four humors.
2. The account of the Fort Sam Houston riot and mutiny late
in 1917 that disclosed the opportunities for abuse possible under
the 1916 Articles of War is badly tangled, less than candid, and
incomplete.
Dr. Generous starts his account of the incident by stating:
"Negro troops, angered by their treatment at the hands of the
Army and the local Texas community, protested violently, were
subdued, and court-martialled." 2 1 Even in today's climate of opinion, this is hardly enough to apprise the reader that the charges
included not only willful disobedience and mutiny but also murder
and assault with intent to murder.2 2 The trial, which lasted over
three weeks, produced a 2,200-page record that was reviewed daily
by the convening authority's staff judge advocate, and that resulted
in thirteen of the sixty-three accused being sentenced to death by
hanging. 23 Those sentences were approved by the convening authority on one day and executed the next morning, the first mass
military execution since Winfield Scott caused the recaptured deserters of the San Patricio Battalion to be hanged after the taking
24
of Chapultepec.
News of the executions reached a War Department that had
not even known of the trial, and there it landed, in the words of a
contemporary, with a dull thud. The immediate result was a
general order prohibiting the execution of any death sentences in
the United States without prior notice to the War Department. 25 A
few days later, another general order provided general review
procedures. 26 Later examination found the Houston record of trial
legally sufficient. Under the 1916 Articles of War, a department
commander in time of war could confirm death sentences for
mutiny and murder; where, as in this instance, he was also the
convening authority, no additional confirming action was neces21

P. 5.

22

General Court-Martial Order No. 1299, Hq. Southern Dep't, Fort Sam Houston,

Texas, Dec. 10, 1917.
23 See Trials by Courts-Martial, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Militay Affairs on S.
5320, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-42, 193-209 (1918); Establishment of Military Justice, Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs on S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-97, 1124-26,
1357-58 (1919).
24 S. E. CHAMBERLAIN, MY CONFESSION 226-28 (1956); C. W. ELLIOTT, WINFIELD ScoTr,
THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN 517, 546"n.27, 555-56 (1937).
25 General Order No. 169, War Dep't, Dec. 29, 1917.
26 General Order No. 7, War Dep't, Jan. 17, 1918.
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sary. The law required no legal review whatever, not even that of
the staff judge advocate.2 7 What had happened was that the department commander, Major General John W. Ruckman, had
exercised his undoubted legal powers with utter lack of judgment.
For this he was shortly afterwards relieved of his command, and
reduced to his permanent grade of brigadier general.28
Dr. Generous's account does not cite the first general order,
nor the congressional hearing dealing primarily with the Houston
trial, nor the commander's subsequent fate.
3. Any reader unacquainted with the position of the Army's
lawyers would surely conclude from this book that, until the
enactment in 1947 of the Elston bill, lawyers did not constitute a
separate corps within the Army. 2 9 Unhappily, the author has
completely confused the separate corps status of Army JA's with
the wholly different question of a separate JA promotion list.
Unlike the Navy's lawyers, who were originally line officers, then
designated as legal specialists but still wearing line insignia, and
not fashioned into a JAG Corps on a par with the Navy's other
staff corps-Medical, Dental, Supply, Civil Engineer, and
Chaplains-until 1967,30 the Army's lawyers had always been distinct from the line, first as the Bureau of Military Justice and then
as the JAGD in successive acts from 1862. 31 These Army lawyers
had separate promotion within their own branch until after the
end of the First World War.
In 1920, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and chaplains were
granted promotion by length of service, whereas judge advocates
were placed on the single list where promotion was by senility: an
officer went up only as those ahead of him grew old or cold.
Promotion was slow between the wars, and the JA's clamored for
27 Legal review was first required by Article of War 46 of 1920. See S. REP. No. 130,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-68 (1916) (Testimony of General E.H. Crowder in support of
proposal to permit partial approval of court-martial findings, in which decision to approve in
part is couched throughout in terms of commander's determination, without any mention of
his judge advocate).
28 ORDER OF BATTLE OF U.S. LAND FORCES IN THE WORLD WAR, ZONE OF THE INTERIOR

602 (1949); ARMY REGISTER 1920, at 8.
29 Pp. 26-27, 191.
30 Act of Dec. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-179, 81 Stat. 545.
21 Act ofJuly 17, 1862, ch. 201, §§ 5-6, 12 Stat. 597, 598; Act ofJuly 28, 1866, ch. 299,
§ 14, 14 Stat. 332, 334; Act ofJune 23, 1874, ch. 458, § 2, 18 Stat. 201, 212; Act of Feb. 2,
1901, ch. 192, § 15, 31 Stat. 748, 751; Act ofJune 3, 1916, ch. 134, § 8, 39 Stat. 166, 169-70;
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, § 8, 41 Stat. 759, 765-66.
In general, line branches were the combatant arms, staff branches the supporting
troops. For example, infantry, cavalry, and artillery were line; quartermasters, medical
personnel, and judge advocates were staff.
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new legislation granting them similar advances by length of service.
Such a bill passed the Senate in 1939.32 Then, when the Elston bill
became law in 1948, its provisions gave JA's a promotion list all
33
their own.
By then such separate treatment was not only unnecessary, it
was actually detrimental. Earlier, in 1940, all Army promotions had
been put on the basis of length of service. 3 4 Even more significantly, between the time that the Elston bill was reported to
the House and the time that it became law, the Officer Personnel
Act of 1947 scrapped the old system entirely and substituted
promotion by selection. 35 In the expanded post-World War II
Army, where half of all officers were not college graduates, this
would have given JA's, most of whom had seven years of education
after high school, a great competitive advantage, except when they
were competing with certified (i.e., decorated) heroes. But by being
placed on the separate list for which they were still clamoring, they
were competing with-and eliminating-themselves. Consequently,
the much-touted separate list placed Army lawyers at such a
substantial disadvantage that before long they had to be rescued
from their long-cherished heart's desire by special legislation which
36
put them back on the single list.

None of the foregoing can be learned from the book under
review.
4. One item verging on the fantastic is the assertion in the
book that the harmless error doctrine was invented for courtsmartial of the pre-Uniform Code era, when they were staffed by
laymen. The author states:
The essence, if not the precise doctrine, of harmless error is
deeply rooted in the traditional view of courts-martial; a military
court was recognized as a function of amateur lawyers and was
governed by rules written especially for them. If the result of
such an affair was punishment of the guilty anr release of the
innocent, why should there be concern about whether -some
arcane rules of procedure were followed exactly? Given this
attitude and the general lack of professional expertise by these
amateurs, however well-trained the services tried to make them,
errors were likely to be frequent, and a harmless error rule was a
necessity.

37

31 S. 1993, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939), which passed the Senate on April 20, 1939. See
84 CONG. REc. 4538-39 (1939).
3' Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 247, 62 Stat. 604, 643.
3 Act of June 13, 1940, ch. 344, 54 Stat. 379.
35 Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 512, 61 Stat. 795 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
36 Act of Aug. 21, 1954, ch. 783, 68 Stat. 758.
7, P. 79.
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Although the author does refer to the federal criminal harmless error statute, which was indeed anticipated by the 1916 Articles
of War 3 8-not followed by the 1920 amendments, as he mistakenly
declares 3 9 -he completely fails to realize that the statutory concept,
civilian as well as military, embraced what the Supreme Court
called a "salutary policy. . . adopted ...after long agitation under
distinguished professional sponsorship. ' 40 Thus, in actual fact,
harmless error was a doctrine that the legal profession forced upon
civilian appellate courts that were acting as "impregnable citadels of
technicality," rather than an invention of Prussian-minded militarists bent on sustaining the convictions of citizen soldiers.
But the author compounds his error when he fails to recognize
that the Powell Committee, 4 ' to whose report he devotes his entire
Chapter 13, actually proposed a definition of harmless error under
which even a mob-dominated trial such as was struck down in
Moore v. Dempsey,4 2 would still have been sustained if only examination could show that a conviction would equally have followed a
perfectly fair trial. Here are the terms of that Committee's proposed Article 59:
An error of law . . .will not be considered to materially

prejudice the substantial rights of an accused unless after consideration of the entire record it is affirmatively determined that a
rehearing would probably
produce a materially more favorable
43
result for the accused.
Yet that proposal, which goes far beyond anything ever tolerated in American criminal law, civilian or military, is not even
commented on by Dr. Generous-though in all fairness it must be
acknowledged that, when proposed, it drew far too little indignation from any source.
Turning from the demonstrably wrong to the inadequately
treated or entirely omitted, there are still significant blotches to be
noticed.
5. The author mentions 44 another infamous Powell Committee proposal, its revised Article 67(a)(1), which would have enlarged the three-judge Court of Military Appeals to five by adding
38 Article of War 37 (Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 656); cf.Act of
Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181.

39 P. 79.
40

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1946).

41 The Powell Committee was a board of general officers appointed by the Secretary of

the Army to examine the operation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
42 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
43Hearings, supra note 15, at 781.
44 P. 143.
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two former judge advocates general.45 But not until his next
chapter does he characterize this for what it was, "the Army's
court-packing scheme. '4 6 Here again, outside indignation was
strangely absent, although in this instance perhaps no one was
prepared to take seriously what was, most charitably viewed, a
manifestation of paranoia.
6. The author's treatment of O'Callahan v. Parker,47 which
held that courts-martial trying undoubted soldiers lacked constitutional power to do so if their offenses were not "service-connected"
is similarly diffused and incomplete. 4 8 The rationale underlying
this newly invented doctrine was that military persons should not
lose their fifth and sixth amendment rights to indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury in cases not involving service-related
charges. Dr. Generous does, a little later,4 9 point out that this
reasoning brushes aside the military exception expressly written
into the fifth amendment. He attributes5 ° to the Toth and Covert
cases 5 ' the principle that military jurisdiction rests on military
status, whereas actually the status test was not formulated until
later, in the Singleton and Guagliardo cases in 1960.52 And he quite
fails to note that the author of the O'Callahan opinion had squarely
asserted in Whelchel v. McDonald,53 less than twenty years earlier,
that those in the military service did not have, and never had, any
right whatsoever to a jury trial.
A lawyer knowledgeable in the field would not have been
guilty of those omissions. But probably only the most realistic
observers would be prepared to assert what is in all likelihood the
true if unpalatable explanation of O'Callahan-thatit was simply
another willful and result-oriented pronouncement by the Warren
Court. Last year, however, a fractionalized Court, in Gosa v.
Mayden, 54 refused to apply O'Callahan retroactively. Nevertheless,
the O'Callahan decision still needs to be overruled as the aberration
45 Hearings, supra note 15, at 781.
46 p. 155.

47 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
48 P. 183-85.
49 P. 200.
50 P. 185.

51 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), withdrawing Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470
(1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
52 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
240-41, 243 (1960).
53 340 U.S. 122, 126-27 (1950).
54 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
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that it was and is. A case in which review was recently granted
55
provides a vehicle for that greatly needed result.
7. Dr. Generous's treatment of administrative discharges is
also deficient, even though all of his Chapter 12 is devoted to that
subject. He never mentions the problem of administrative discharges for officer misconduct, a subject extensively aired by
Senator Ervin in hearings on two occasions. 56 And he is unaware
that the present provisions governing administrative separations
for such misconduct were actually enacted in 1960 during the
pendency of a lawsuit that established the lack of any earlier
statutory basis for such proceedings.5 7
The foregoing represent the primary, deficiencies in the
Generous work; the list of errors could be substantially extended.
Some of these derive not simply from .lack of background, but
from faulty techniques. Thus, the author too frequently relies on
secondary rather than primary authorities. This fault mars his
treatment of the court-martial controversy that followed the First
World War-the text cites a law review article and the essentially
inadequate biography of General Crowder, reflecting the author's
failure to study adequately the lengthy 1919 hearings on the
Ansell articles. 5 8 Similarly, for the trial of Henry Wirz, commandant of the notorious Confederate prison at Andersonville, he cites
only two modern rehashes 59 rather than the verbatim record of
trial contained in a congressional document. °
The book thus relies on second-hand versions of vital source
materials. The author's interview with this reviewer is garbled with
respect to two matters, 6 ' creating a reasonable doubt whether at
least some of his discussions with others have been accurately
rendered in all respects.
55 Schlesinger v. Councilman, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1973)
(No. 73-662, Dec. 17, 1973).
56 Military Justice, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comms. on the Judiciary and on Armed
Services on S. 745 and Sundry Other Bills, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Hearings, supra note 15.
57 See Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-616, 74 Stat. 386, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§
3791-97, 8791-97 (1970). The case of Ledford v. Brucker had been filed on Dec. 18, 1959.
For the pleadings and appeal papers therein (also sub nom. Ledford v. Curran, 366 U.S. 948
(1961)), see Hearings, supra note 15, at 635-735. See also Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962),
vacating 200 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1961). Both officers concerned were ultimately given clean
retirements.
58 Hearings on Establishment of Military Justice, supra note 23.
59 P. 226 n.2.
60 H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
61 Pp. 178, 225 nA5.
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The bibliography fails to show examination of the service
journals, such as the United States Naval Institute Proceedings and
Army magazine and its predecessors; these all contained valuable
treatments and significant points of view on military discipline and
justice. Instead, the authorities listed include what doubtless is
required of doctoral candidates, the enumeration of statutes and
law reports, indispensable sources to be sure, but hardly appropriate for continued inclusion after the thesis is published. Furthermore, reference is made more difficult for the reader by the
absence of any table of cases, and by the manifestation of that
current disease of publishers, the substitution of backnotes for
footnotes. Inconvenience to the user of the book is compounded in
this instance since the backnotes do not use short titles but refer
only to the numbers assigned to the several items in the bibliography. Thus, the reader seeking the author's documentation for a
given statement is sent off on a species of paper-chase.
It would be unfair to criticize Dr. Generous unduly for the
faults detailed above, since so many of them reflect not his own
very agreeable and outgoing personality and obvious industry, but
primarily the pitfalls that await the layman who ventures to treat a
particularly complex field and system of law. In addition, the
author's credentials are not impressive on any footing; even the
publisher's dust-jacket; a medium not normally prone to understatement, can only venture this: "A professional historian who as a
commissioned naval officer sat on several courts-martial, Dr.
Generous now teaches at the Choate School in Wallingford, Connecticut."
No, the blame for the present badly flawed work rests with the
cognizant graduate faculty, who conferred upon it the accolade of
the highest earned academic degree. Whether they were unaware
of its manifold inaccuracies and shortcomings because of unfamiliarity with the subject-matter, whether they were willing to accept it
because some at least of its conclusions accorded with the antimilitarism that now infects so many universities, it is unnecessary to
inquire. The brutal fact is that when a thesis as deficient as this one
is shown to be still passes muster, its stigma rests on the teachers
who approved the work, not on the earnest student who simply
tendered it.
Frederick Bernays Wiener*
*
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